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PRODUCT SET GRANULARITY AND CONSUMER RESPONSE 
TO RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Many consumer decisions are assisted by product recommendations. When providing such 
recommendations, there is an inherent tension between (1) presenting a set of products that are 
close in attractiveness (fine product set granularity) and (2) presenting a wider range of products 
that are more different in attractiveness (coarse product set granularity). While the former can 
maximize the attractiveness of the recommended set of products, the latter makes it easier for 
consumers to determine which of the recommended products is most attractive, thus boosting 
consumer response. Evidence from a large-scale field study (with naturally occurring variation in 
the granularity of recommendation sets) provides strong support for this tension and shows that 
less fine-grained product recommendation sets promote consumer response. We also find that, in 
line with our theorizing, coarser set granularity increases the time consumers spend processing 
detailed information about individual products relative to time they spend comparing products at 
the set level. These effects are less pronounced when consumer engagement in the decision 
process is low. The key insights from the field study are replicated in a tightly controlled 
experiment (using a different product domain). The findings of this research have important 
implications for how best to integrate large online assortments and product recommendations to 
stimulate consumer response.  
 
 
Keywords: product recommendations, product set granularity, online assortments, consumer 
response, consumer decision-making. 
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Introduction 
For many online product decisions, consumers have access to a vast array of alternatives. 
Online retailers’ assortments are typically very large and product comparison sites even bring 
together products from multiple retailers and suppliers. These online firms often help consumers 
in making product decisions by providing product recommendations in the form of a list of 
suitable alternatives (i.e., products meeting criteria that the consumer has specified) that are 
sorted in terms of one or more features relevant to the consumer (e.g., price). We refer to these 
product recommendation systems as explicit recommendation systems in that they clearly state 
their aim of matching products to consumers’ preferences (Li and Karahanna 2015; Xiao and 
Benbasat 2007). They are common in practice and their effectiveness has been examined in the 
fields of marketing (Dellaert and Häubl 2012; Häubl and Murray 2003; Häubl and Trifts 2000) 
and information systems (Komiak and Benbasat 2006; Tam and Ho 2006; Wang and Benbasat 
2008).  
An essential property of explicit product recommendation systems is that they screen and 
sort product assortments for the consumer. As a result, they reduce the need for consumers to 
search for high quality products, and they have been shown to improve consumer decision 
outcomes (Häubl and Trifts 2000; Li and Karahanna 2015). Firms also benefit from providing 
recommendations because the reduction in search effort can increase consumer response. 
Depending on the firm’s business model, typical target responses are sales (for deal-based 
business models – i.e., online retailers) or click-throughs to external vendors (for lead-based 
business models – product comparison websites). Analyzing whether or not consumers respond 
to a product recommendation set by placing an order is essential for firms (Davis 2018) and in 
line with previous research in decision making that addressed the question of consumer 
  
4
response to sets of different composition (Chernev 2005; Dhar 1997; Dhar and Nowlis 2004). 
We propose that even though consumers’ need to search a large assortment is significantly 
reduced by product recommendations, they may still experience difficulty in selecting the most 
attractive alternative from a recommended set. The reason for this is that with the emergence of 
large online assortments, product differentiation has become increasingly fine-grained, resulting 
in smaller differences between competing products. As a result, it is often challenging for 
consumers to make product comparisons at the set level and decide which of the available 
alternatives is the best one for them (Dellaert et al. 2012; Shugan 1980). This increased 
difficulty of determining the best alternative due to the increased closeness in attractiveness 
between alternatives, in turn, increases the likelihood of choice deferral (Chernev 2006; Dhar 
1996; Dhar 1997; Dhar and Nowlis 2004). Paradoxically, this effect of large assortments on 
consumer decision making cannot be overcome, and may even be amplified, by product 
recommendations, which tend to group alternatives that are very similar in attractiveness at the 
top of the recommended list.  
Therefore, we argue that there is an inherent tension when providing product 
recommendations to consumers between the benefits of presenting those products that are 
closest in (high) predicted attractiveness (fine product set granularity), and presenting a wider 
range of products that are more different in predicted attractiveness (coarse product set 
granularity). While the first approach maximizes the predicted attractiveness of the initially 
recommended set, we propose that the second strategy makes it easier for consumers to 
determine which product is the most attractive one to them and renders the desired response by 
consumers (e.g., completing a purchase or requesting further information) more likely. 
The present research uses naturally occurring variation in field data to investigate whether 
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consumer response to recommendations varies with the difference in attractiveness between 
products presented to consumers at the top of a recommendation list. More specifically, we 
examine how consumer response to recommendations depends on the degree of granularity of 
the recommended products when alternatives are presented in a list of descending order, as is 
typically the case in recommendation lists (Diehl and Zauberman 2005; Häubl and Trifts 2000). 
Finer granularity causes the attractiveness of products in the recommendation list to decline less 
strongly, while coarser granularity leads to a greater decline in attractiveness. We propose a 
conceptual framework to explain how finer product set granularity reduces consumer response 
in large online assortments, despite the fact that the recommended top set of products is more 
attractive than in the case of coarser product set granularity.  
While prior research on closeness in attractiveness between alternatives and consumer 
decision making typically relied on lab-experiments (Anderson 2003; Chernev et al. 2015; Dhar 
1997), we test our predictions in two studies that differ in terms of data collection method (field 
and experimental evidence) and product category (financial products and consumer electronics). 
First, we analyze clickstream field data of a large sample of consumers who visited a financial 
product recommendation website. Using detailed information on variation in the particular 
products at the top of the recommendation list presented to each individual consumer, we first 
show that finer product set granularity in recommended products (captured by the average 
difference in attractiveness among the alternatives in the top recommended set) decreases 
consumer response – i.e., reduces the likelihood that a consumer requests a mortgage quote.  
Next, we provide insights into the behavioral mechanisms underlying consumer response 
using two indicators of a consumer’s decision process that are readily available to firms. By 
their nature, online recommendation and shopping websites cannot easily present all product 
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information at once for each of the listed products. Therefore, the decision environments of 
these websites typically offer two layers of information to consumers that also structure the 
decision process. The first layer presents a ranking of products with their most important 
features (we refer to this as the set level layer). In this layer, consumers make comparisons 
between products to determine which ones are sufficiently attractive to warrant further 
inspection. Next, by clicking on an individual product, consumers can access the second layer of 
information, which presents more detailed information for each product separately (we refer to 
this as the product level layer). After inspecting one or more products, consumers can then 
choose to place an order or request a quote on the website or not. By using data on the extent of 
information processing by consumers in each of the two layers in our data, we obtain process-
oriented insights on the effect of finer product set granularity on consumer response.  
In our conceptual framework, we propose that with finer product set granularity, consumer 
information processing at the set level increases, relative to information processing at the 
product level. Theoretically, this effect is due to an asymmetry in the impact of closeness in 
product attractiveness on the number of product comparisons required to determine which 
products are worthy of more detailed inspection versus the number of detailed product 
inspections that consumers undertake. We propose that the former is more strongly affected than 
the latter. Our analysis shows that as predicted the ratio of processing time at the product level 
and the total of product plus set level processing time decreases with finer product granularity 
and that this ratio mediates the impact of finer product set granularity on consumer response as 
predicted. Furthermore, we show that the effect is moderated by the level of consumer 
engagement in the decision process, such that it is not present for consumers with a low decision 
engagement, and that it remains robust across different operationalizations of measuring 
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granularity. Finally, we extend the generalizability of our findings by providing confirming 
evidence in a controlled experiment  in the context of consumer electronics (i.e., digital 
cameras).  
Thus, the current research contributes to the literature in three ways. First, while prior 
research has extensively addressed the potential (negative) impact of closeness in product 
attractiveness on consumer response (Chernev 2006; Dhar 1997), this is the first study to 
evidence this effect on consumer response in the field (Anderson 2003; Broniarczyk and Griffin 
2014; Chernev et al. 2015). Thus, a key contribution of our paper is to demonstrate, using real-
world field data, a behavioral effect of closeness in product attractiveness on consumer 
response. We demonstrate that consumers’ response to product recommendations is lowered due 
to more fine-grained sets, despite the fact that these sets provides them with better products. 
Second, we provide new insights on how individuals process recommendation sets to support 
the understanding of what drives the impact of finer product granularity on consumer response. 
While prior research on consumer response typically focuses on consumer information 
processing at a single layer of information only (e.g., Dhar 1996), we propose a conceptual 
model where product set granularity affects consumer response through two decision steps that 
are reflective of most (retail) websites. These steps are related to set- and product level 
information processing and represent directly observable behavioral indicators of the amount of 
information processing at the different layers of online shopping and recommendation websites. 
Thus, the framework allows us to investigate the behavioral impact of product granularity, using 
variables that are easily accessible to managers and the insights from our research have clear 
managerial implications also. We also report the results of a simulation to illustrate how the 
insights from our study can be used to guide how firms can best combine large assortments and 
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product recommendations to promote consumer response. Third, we provide evidence that the 
effect of finer product set granularity is moderated by the level of consumer engagement in the 
decision process. While more engaged consumers respond negatively to product sets with finer 
granularity, those who are less engaged are less sensitive to granularity differences, and explore 
products simply to obtain an initial understanding of the product category.  
 
Product Set Granularity and Consumer Response to Product 
Recommendations  
As a starting point for our analysis, we define product set granularity as the average 
difference in attractiveness between all pairs of products in an assortment that are adjacent 
(closest) in terms of product attractiveness. Finer product set granularity implies that the 
differences in attractiveness between adjacent alternatives in an assortment are smaller, while 
coarser product set granularity implies that these differences are larger. In assortments, fine 
product set granularity occurs when many different product variants are offered (e.g., many 
different colors, sizes, brands, etc.). The reason is that when more and more product variants are 
introduced, more refined differences between products are made possible, and hence smaller 
differences in attractiveness arise from one product to the next.  
With fine product set granularity, a randomly presented list of alternatives can still produce 
considerable differences in attractiveness from one alternative to the next. Importantly, however, 
when recommendation lists are offered the sorting of alternatives in terms of product 
attractiveness inherently presents consumers with more similar alternatives at the top of the 
recommendation list when product set granularity is fine than when it is coarse. 
In this research, we address the question of how finer (vs. coarser) product set granularity 
affects consumers’ response to recommendations. More specifically, we address explicit product 
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recommendation systems that provide consumers with a list of products that are sorted in terms 
of one or more attributes (e.g., price) of relevance to the consumer (Häubl and Trifts 2000; Xiao 
and Benbasat 2007). Research has shown that these product recommendation lists help 
consumers by reducing the search effort needed to find high quality alternatives (Häubl and 
Trifts 2000; Li and Karahanna 2015). As a result, recommendation lists improve the quality of 
consumer decisions (Diehl et al. 2003; Häubl and Trifts 2000; Xiao and Benbasat 2007), which 
also increases consumer satisfaction and loyalty (Liang et al. 2006).  
The fact that product recommendation lists present consumers with a sorted list of the most 
attractive products is of particular importance in relation to the level of product granularity of 
assortments. Because of this presentation format, recommended products are likely to be close in 
attractiveness, making the top set of products more attractive to consumers than if no sorting 
were available. When product granularity becomes more fine-grained, this attractiveness of the 
top set of recommended products increases further, because the distance in attractiveness 
between the most highly recommended product and the subsequent products becomes smaller. 
Thus, finer product granularity further increases the attractiveness of the top set of recommended 
products, because consumers now see a more attractive set of products at the top of the 
recommendation list.  
Normatively, this more attractive top set of products should also make it more likely for 
consumers to respond to the firm’s offer by choosing one of the products in the recommended 
set. However, we propose that, behaviorally, a consequence of finer product set granularity is 
that it is more challenging for consumers to identify their preferred alternative from the top of the 
set or recommended products (Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Dellaert et al. 2012; Liberman and 
Förster 2006). The increased difficulty of having to choose among more similar product requires 
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consumers to engage in more effortful decision strategies to choose the best alternative from the 
set of top alternatives (Bettman et al. 1993; Johnson et al. 1989; Klein and Yadav 1989). This 
effort requirement is likely to demotivate the consumer to make a decision, and may even exceed 
the potential positive effects of choosing from a set of attractive alternatives (Dhar 1996; Fasolo 
et al. 2009; Tyebjee 1979). 
Therefore, we propose that finer product set granularity (i.e., smaller differences in terms 
of product attractiveness from one alternative to the next) reduces consumer response to product 
recommendation lists. Conversely, coarser product set granularity should facilitate consumer 
response as it allows consumers to more easily determine which of the products is most attractive 
(Dellaert and Häubl 2012; Dhar 1997; Liberman and Forster 2006). With coarser product set 
granularity, consumers can also more easily perceive that the best product they encountered is 
more attractive than the more inferior alternatives they have seen and which serve as reference 
points (Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; Mellers 2000).  
The mediating role of consumer product level relative to set level information 
processing 
The predicted negative effect of finer product set granularity on consumer response 
suggests a psychological mechanism governed by the ease of identifying the most attractive 
product in a recommendation set as well as the perceived attractiveness of this product. To 
investigate this mechanism more explicitly, we use as behavioral indicators of information 
processing time the amount of time that consumers engage with information about the 
recommended products, as is common in prior work on decision difficulty in consumer decision 
making (Fischer et al. 2000; Jacoby et al. 1976; Payne et al. 1988). In particular, we analyze how 
much time a consumer spent processing information (1) at the level of the set of top alternatives 
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in the product recommendation list and (2) at the level of individual products, one at a time (see 
Figure 1). Such a decision environment is common in commercial websites and highlights the 
tension between comparing and investigating product related information. We predict that the 
effect of finer product set granularity influences the relative allocation of consumer processing 
time across the two information layers, which in turn influences consumer response. 
In particular, we propose that consumers follow a process by which they: (1) identify in a 
recommended set, which products are worth inspecting in greater detail, and (2) for each 
product that they inspect in detail if they should request a quote or not (in the field study), or if 
they should order it or not (in the experiment in Study 2). Within this process, we hypothesize 
that as closeness in attractiveness increases (i.e., with finer product set granularity), consumers 
will need more time to identify which product form a set is sufficiently attractive to warrant 
further detailed inspection. This increase in time is due to the greater number of comparisons 
consumers will need to make between products when they are more similar to be able to identify 
the most attractive one(s) for further inspection (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993; Moyer and 
Bayer 1976; Shugan 1980). With coarser product set granularity, the inclusion of less attractive 
alternatives near the top of the recommendation list facilitates this identification process because 
it increases the perceived attractiveness of the best alternatives as they stand out more clearly 
from the less attractive ones (Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; Mellers 2000). Thus, the 
number of comparisons will increase non-linearly with finer product granularity with a greater 
number of products being candidates for detailed inspection.  
Additionally,  we predict that the number of products that consumers inspect in detail will 
only increase at a much smaller rate, even when many candidates are available. The reason for 
this second prediction is twofold. First, the number of products in a set only increases linearly, 
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while the number of comparisons increases non-linearly. Second, behaviorally, the additional 
effort of having to click through to the next level of inspection will likely disproportionally 
affect detailed product inspection more strongly than set level inspection (Häubl, , Dellaert & 
Donkers 2010). Thus, we anticipate that the increase in product inspections with finer product 
granularity will dampened due to the additional (behavioral) cost of inspection.  
Consumers’ information processing of recommended products logically precedes their 
response to product recommendations. Our theorizing about why finer product set granularity 
decreases consumer response to these lists implies that this effect is mediated by how consumers 
engage with the information about the recommended products. Therefore, we propose that the 
ratio of the time spent on information processing at the product level over the total of product 
plus set level processing time mediates the effect of finer product set granularity predicted on 
consumer response. Such a measure of relative time spent has been previously implemented in 
the context of consumer decision strategies (Riedl et al. 2008). Figure 1 illustrates the 
hypothesized behavioral mechanism for the impact of finer product set granularity on consumer 
response.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Study 1: Field Evidence 
The empirical analysis for our field study is based on clickstream data from a leading 
recommendation website for financial products in the Netherlands. The website serves as an 
intermediary between consumers and financial institutions. The data capture consumers’ online 
product inspection and choice behavior in connection with home mortgages. Home mortgages 
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represent a suitable domain for our research because consumers tend to make careful decisions 
when choosing their mortgage (Huang et al. 2009), yet can still benefit from product 
recommendations to help them find a suitable product in a complex market with many different 
alternatives.  
We obtained two months of clickstream data and analyzed a total of 9,330 visits to the 
recommendation website that occurred during this period1. For each visit, the top alternatives in 
the recommendation list (i.e., the most attractive recommended products)2, the user’s individual 
characteristics, his/her desired mortgage specifications, clickstream data capturing his/her set 
level and product level processing, and any requests for quotes were recorded.  
On 74.3 percent of the visits, at least one alternative was inspected in detail. The average 
number of products inspected on a visit was 1.17. A mortgage quote was requested on 27.2 
percent of the visits. The average annual gross income of the consumers using the 
recommendation website was 43,485 euros, and the average mortgage required was 223,202 
euros – both are representative of the mortgage market in the Netherlands at the time.  
Users of the website entered their desired mortgage specifications – in particular 
mortgage type3, mortgage amount, and initial term of fixed interest rate (e.g., 5 years) – along 
with several individual characteristics (e.g., current personal bank and annual income). Based 
                                                 
1 Only visits during which a user proceeded to the point where a recommendation was provided were included in the 
analysis. We also only included visits in which a single product recommendation set was obtained. Finally, we only 
included visits with decision times that fell within realistically feasible lower and upper limits (i.e., a minimum of 10 
seconds of set level processing and at most 30 minutes of inactivity during the visit) (Moe 2003). 
2 The website collected information about the first nine products of each recommended set, all of which were 
displayed on a single page. The firm uses a type of conjoint style task that is offered to internal experts to provide 
expert advice to rank the quality of different mortgage products. Based on the estimated weights applied by these 
experts in their decisions, the balanced ranking is made. This approach is taken because expert judgments are 
deemed to be a more accurate source of product quality information, and hence a preferred basis for providing 
recommendations, than e.g., an algorithm based on consumers’ own mortgage choices. Given that no information 
beyond the consumer provided characteristics (and the internal quality ratings) are used to feed the recommender 
system the same recommendation rules apply to all consumers. 
3 The available mortgage types were (1) combined savings and interest-based mortgages, (2) interest-only 
mortgages, and (3) annuity mortgages. 
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on this information, they were then presented with a list of recommended mortgage products. 
This list presented the alternatives that matched the consumer’s specifications sorted (in 
ascending order) by interest rate, which is the most critical attribute when choosing a mortgage 
product (Devlin 2002; Laroche and Taylor 1988). The description of each alternative consisted 
of the name of the firm providing the mortgage, along with the administrative fee for closing 
the mortgage and two rating scores. The first was a rating of the mortgage product by the 
recommendation website (from 1 to 5 stars), and the second was the average rating of the 
mortgage provider by its current clients (on a scale from 1 to 10). 
For each product on the list, consumers were able to click to inspect a more detailed 
description, which was then presented on a separate screen. Consumers were able to request a 
quote from the mortgage provider via the recommendation website. The final part of the 
transaction (i.e., the signing of the mortgage contract) was completed directly between the 
consumer and the mortgage provider. The recommendation website earns a fee per lead (i.e., 
request of a mortgage quote) paid by the firm receiving the lead. We use the request of a 
mortgage quote as our dependent variable of a positive consumer response to the product 
recommendation list – i.e., the desired consumer outcome from the website’s standpoint.  
Measures 
Interest rates are the most critical component in a mortgage choice (Devlin 2002; Laroche 
and Taylor 1988) and past studies have shown that most prospective borrowers spend most of 
their time searching for and comparing interest rates (Lee & Hogarth 1999). Further, market-
oriented studies showed that interest rate are the most important attributes regarding a mortgage 
choice (National Mortgage Database 2016). Inherently, interest rates were also the firm’s basis 
for generating the product recommendations in our field study data. However, since there may be 
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more product attributes that define attractiveness of a mortgage, we further operationalize 
mortgage product attractiveness and product set granularity also on the basis of two additional 
key product attributes that are accessible in the product set page; product rating and provider 
rating.  
Product Set Attractiveness. We use three separate measures for set attractiveness, based on 
the most attractive value for each of the three attributes accessible at the set page. For the interest 
rate we use the lowest value in the set (i.e., that of the first recommended product) as our 
measure of product set attractiveness. In the analysis, this value is multiplied by minus 1 to 
reflect that lower interest rates are more attractive. In addition, we also use the highest product 
rating and the highest provider rating in the product set to capture product set attractiveness on 
these dimensions. The product rating is based on the website’s own experts’ evaluation of the 
quality of the mortgage product, while the provider rating is based on other customers’ reviews 
of the mortgage product provider (e.g., a bank). 
Product Set Granularity. We quantify product set granularity as the average difference in 
attractiveness (for interest rate, product rating and provider rating) between the alternatives in the 
recommendation list. The smaller this average difference in attractiveness, the finer product set 
granularity is. It is calculated as -1 * (best value – worst value) / (number of products), where we 
use the multiplication with -1 so that high numbers depict finer product set granularity. The field 
data we obtained, contain information about the first nine products of the recommendation list, 
hence we determine product set granularity based on these products.  
Consumer Response. We operationalize consumer response as a binary variable that 
captures whether a consumer’s visit to the recommendation website culminated in the request of 
a mortgage quote. This operationalization is in accordance with the business model of the 
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website since it is based on a fee per lead (i.e., request of a mortgage quote) paid by the firm 
receiving the lead.  
Processing Time. In line with our conceptual model, we distinguish between set level and 
product level processing in the amount of time a consumer spent processing information about 
the recommended products. Set level processing is measured as the total time spent on the page 
displaying the set of recommended mortgage products. Product level information processing is 
operationalized as the total time spent on pages with detailed information about each individual 
product. The inputs for these time-based measures are the observed time differences between 
consecutive page requests. Since duration data are left truncated (i.e., non-negative) and right 
skewed, we log transformed all time measures in line with standard practice (Bucklin and 
Sismeiro 2003; Johnson et al. 2003).4 The transformed variables are approximately normally 
distributed. A challenge associated with clickstream data is that the duration of the last page view 
of a visit is unobservable since the time when a user exits the website can typically not be 
recorded (Sismeiro and Bucklin 2004). However, when the last recorded event was a product 
level inspection, we include this in TimeProduct by imputing the average product inspection time 
for the unobserved value. We calculate the ratio of product time (Ratio Product Time) over the 
total time spent on these two types of pages (results are robust to different specifications, see 
robustness checks).  
Other Product Variables. For robustness and to more accurately estimate the impact of the 
variables of substantive interest, we estimate our model including several other variables that 
capture properties of the top set of alternatives. First, we include the (inter-attribute) correlation 
                                                 
4. To be able to include visits during which no product level processing occurred, we added one second to 
TimeProduct and each of the other time measures before the log transformation. 
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between attractiveness (interest rate) and product/provider ratings among the top alternatives. A 
more negative inter-attribute correlation implies greater trade-off difficulty (Bettman et al. 1993; 
Johnson et al. 1989; Ordonez 1998) and this might also render consumers less likely to respond 
(Dhar 1997). We allow for this possibility by including the average of the pairwise correlations 
between interest rate and each of the two ratings among the top alternatives in the 
recommendation list (AttributeCorrelation). Second, we include two remaining variables to 
capture other possible impacts of set attractiveness. They are: (1) A dummy variable to indicate 
if the users’ current bank is present among the top alternatives in the recommendation list 
(Current), and (2) the average administrative fee that was charged for the mortgage products in 
the set (AdminFee). 
Control Variables. Finally, we include several control variables that are not related to the 
recommended product set, but that may also impact consumer response. These include 
information consumers provided on the website before obtaining a recommendation. More 
precisely, we control for (a) whether a consumer disclosed his/her income or not and his/her 
specified income, (b) whether a consumer disclosed the amount of the desired mortgage or not 
and the actual specified amount of the mortgage, (c) whether a consumer specified a period for a 
fixed interest rate or not and the specified period, and (d) the requested mortgage type. Further 
we control for whether different product providers were present in a product set (26 brand 
dummies). Finally, we control for the session’s time of the day (at an hourly basis) and for the 
day of the week (weekend dummy). These variables are detailed in Appendix A.  
Correcting for Consumer Input-Based Sources of Variation in Product Set Granularity  
Our theoretical framework focuses on the impact of product set granularity on consumer 
response to product recommendation lists. In the field data, variation in product set granularity 
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arises from two sources – (1) the consumer’s own input, and (2) the market dynamics in the 
available alternatives that were exogenous to the consumer choice. Inherently, as a first source of 
variation, the composition of the list of recommended products varied as a function of the desired 
mortgage specifications entered by a consumer. This generated variations in product set 
granularity between consumers, for example because some product specifications corresponded 
to a greater number of products that were available in the market than others. In addition, 
mortgage providers also varied their products’ characteristics (such as interest rates offered) in 
response to economic factors and competitors’ concurrent offerings. This second source also 
generates differences in the product set granularity of the list of recommended products across 
consumers. Since we cannot rule out the possibility that for the first source of variation 
(consumer input) the composition of the recommendation list and consumer response to these 
recommendations might be influenced by a common unobservable variable, we control for this 
source of variation in our analysis to remove the possible endogeneity bias associated with it. 
More specifically, we separate the potentially endogenous variation in the product set 
granularity from the exogenous variation that is present. To do this, we model all properties of 
the recommended set as a function of the specifications entered by the consumer (see Appendix 
B for details). The residuals of these models characterize the properties of the set that cannot be 
explained by the consumer’s input, thus capturing the impact of independent variation in the 
market, which is exogenous to the consumer’s pre-existing propensity to respond to the 
recommendation. Hence, similar to the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method (Terza et al. 
2008), we include both the endogenous and the residual exogenous components of product set 
granularity. As we use a nonlinear model for conversion, consistency can only be achieved by 
including both components, while traditional 2SLS, which only includes the exogenous 
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component, would result in inconsistent estimates (Terza et al. 2008). Our approach is similar in 
spirit to the control function approach (Petrin and Train 2010), but differs because usually one 
has access to exogenous regressors with a possibly endogenous error term, while in our situation 
there is possible endogeneity in the regressors that we wish to account for. As the residuals of the 
regressions, which are driven by variation in market conditions after controlling for mortgage 
specifications, capture the exogenous variation in product set granularity, we use the coefficients 
on these residuals to test our expected effects. The 2SRI estimator that we apply has already been 
successfully applied in marketing (Shen & Xiao 2014; Danaher et al. 2015), see also the review 
on endogeneity in marketing models by Papies et al. (2017). 
Models 
Consumer Response Model. We examine the consumer’s decision to request a mortgage 
quote via the recommendation website. This model predicts the probability of consumer response 
during a given visit to the website. We use a binary logit model to characterize the consumer’s 
decision to request a quote for a mortgage product from the recommendation list 
(ConsumerResponse = 1) or not (ConsumerResponse = 0) as a function of product set 
granularity, as well as other variables. To indicate that we use the (exogenous) residuals for 
various independent variables in our analysis, these variables are denoted with a superscript (R). 
We include both a linear and a quadratic term for granularity measures to allow for potential 
non-linearity in the expected effects. In all models we include the other product variables listed 
under measures and the set of control variables, but these are not included in detail in the 
equations below for expositional clarity. 
𝑃(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒௜ = 1) =
exp (𝑉௜ )
1 + exp (𝑉௜ )
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(1) 𝑉௜  = β0 + β1InterestRateAttractivenessi(R) + β2InterestRateGranularityi(R) + 
β3ProductRatingAttractivenessi(R) + β4ProductRatingGranularityi(R) + 
β5ProviderRatingAttractivenessi(R) + β6ProviderRatingGranularityi(R) + Controls 
 
Processing Time Models. To model the amount of time a consumer spent on the page displaying 
the set of recommended mortgage products (TimeSet), we regress the log of this duration 
variable on product set granularity and attractiveness, as well as the other properties of the 
products in the recommendation list and the control variables. The error term (ζi) is assumed to 
be normally distributed. 
 
(2) RatioProductTimei = γ0 + 1InterestRateAttractivenessi(R) + 2InterestRateGranularityi(R) + 
3ProductRatingAttractivenessi(R) + 4ProductRatingGranularityi(R) +  
5ProviderRatingAttractivenessi(R) + 6ProviderRatingGranularityi(R) + Controls + ζi  
 
Results 
We first examine the effect of finer product set granularity in the recommendation list on 
consumer response (Table 1 / Column 1). As anticipated, interest rate was the strongest 
determinant of consumer response. The results show that, as predicted, for interest rate a finer 
product set granularity has a significant negative effect on consumer response to 
recommendations (β2 = -7.56, p < 0.05). Also, as expected, the baseline effect of attractiveness 
of the recommendation list on consumer response is positive (β1 = 0.58, p < 0.05). The effects 
of product and provider rating attractiveness are not significant. This result can be explained by 
the fact that interest rate is the most important attribute in decision-making in the context of 
home mortgages and the ranking is also based on interest rate.  
 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Next, we shed light onto the behavioral mechanisms underlying the effect of the product 
set granularity on consumer response by examining the ratio of product level processing – i.e., 
the amount of time consumers spent processing information at the level of individual products, 
over the total time spent in the session. We expected that finer product set granularity decreases 
the ratio of product level processing and consumers are less likely to inspect alternatives in 
detail. We find that finer product set granularity does have a significant negative effect on the 
ratio of time spent processing detailed information about alternatives (λ2 = -1.21, p < 0.05).  
To test the expected pathway based on our conceptual framework, i.e. finer product set 
granularity in a recommendation list influences consumer response to recommendations via the 
ratio of product level processing of information over the total time spent at the product and set 
level in a session, we conduct a mediation analysis (Zhao et al. 2010). We find that, in line with 
our prediction, the ratio of product level information processing time has a positive effect on the 
probability of consumer response (βRatio Product Time = 2.43, p < 0.01) (Table 1 / Columns 3-4). 
The estimation results show that the effect of a finer interest rate granularity is no longer 
significant once the ratio of product level processing time is included in the model. This 
provides support for the predicted mediation effect. The effect is robust when we control for the 
total time spent. We run a bootstrap analysis (Hayes 2012; Pieters 2017; Zhao et al. 2010) to 
conduct a more rigorous mediation test5. The focus of this analysis is on interest rate granularity 
in line with our preliminary findings above. We report unstandardized coefficients. The results 
further support our predicted effects. We find a significant total indirect effect of finer interest 
rate granularity (effect = -2.99; se = 1.05; LB: -5.09; UB: -0.93). This finding demonstrates that 
                                                 
5 N=9330; 5000 bootstrapped samples; Unstandardized coefficients are shown; LL is lower level, and UL is upper 
level of 95% confidence interval. 
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the negative indirect effect through product level processing is due to the fact that finer product 
set granularity decreases the ratio of product level information processing, which in turn also 
decreases consumer response. 
Additional Analyses of Moderating Effects 
The findings of this study suggest that more fine-grained product recommendation sets decrease 
consumer response. Such an effect is mediated by the relative time spent in processing product 
level information. Having established the effects of product set granularity on consumer 
response, we investigate their heterogeneity across various (a) decision engagement, (b) product 
set features and (c) financial characteristics. Below we discuss the theoretical motivation and 
findings for these moderators. 
First, to rule out that our findings are driven by the level of consumer engagement in the 
decision process, we examined the heterogeneous effects of finer product set granularity for 
different clusters of customers depending on their stage in the purchase funnel. Prior research 
suggests that for consumers who are less engaged in the decision process, attribute information 
in a choice set is less meaningful and less likely to drive their information processing approach. 
These consumers have less well-defined product preferences and therefore are less likely to be 
influenced by product set attribute differences (Ratneshwar et al. 1987). Once consumers 
become more engaged in the decision process, they form clear preferences and they become 
more goal directed in their information processing (Moe 2003). As a result, consumers who are 
more engaged in a decision are likely to be more susceptible to the effect of finer product set 
granularity. Conversely, we expect that with lower decision engagement consumers will process 
choice set cues more superficially and (have less knowledge about alternatives. Therefore, we 
expect that they will be less sensitive to product granularity differences (Bettman & Park 1980). 
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Note that this theorizing is also in line with the concept of a purchase funnel and how consumer 
advancement in the purchase funnel relates to information processing (Bettman et al. 1998).  
In the field data, we identify consumer engagement in the decision in the following way. 
When consumers entered the website, they were asked to specify the amount of the desired 
mortgage, their income and the period of fixed interest rate. However, these answers were not 
mandatory and they could also skip them. We identify consumers who do not fill the above 
information as less engaged in the decision process. Further, we identified a dummy variable 
called decision engagement as high when consumers filled all the personal information and low 
otherwise.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We conducted subsample analyses and found that the identified effects of product set 
granularity on consumer response is significant for consumers that had filled information about 
the amount, income and period of fixed rate (Table 2 / Columns 1-2). We obtained similar 
results when we analyzed all the components of decision engagement independently. The effect 
of product set granularity is significant only for those consumers who specified (a) the amount 
of the mortgage (Table 2 / Columns 3-4), (b) their income (Table 2 / Column 5), and (c) a fixed 
period of interest rate (Table 2 / Columns 6-7). We found similar evidence for the effects of 
product set granularity on the ratio of product level processing time.  
Next, we further analyzed the models including interaction effects with the variables of 
interest. These analyses show that the direct effects remain robust whereas the interaction 
effects are not significant. Thus, we conclude that the results in our field data are indicative of a 
moderating effect of decision engagement, but do not provide statistical support for the 
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anticipated effect. We anticipate that due to the high engagement context of mortgages on the 
website for our field data, most consumers can be considered as relatively highly engaged with 
the decision. Therefore, we further address the moderating effect of consumer decision 
engagement in our second experimental study on consumer electronics. 
Second, using product set granularity as an independent variable in the models entails that 
recommendation sets with the same best and worst recommended alternative, left-skewed and 
right-skewed sets (i.e. sets with more concentration in low interest rate versus high interest rate 
mortgages) are treated uniformly. However, these sets may potentially have differential effects 
on how users process product information and how they respond. Therefore, we also examine 
the effect of product granularity when controlling for the skewness and kurtosis of the 
distribution of the attribute levels of the products in the recommendation set. We calculated the 
skewness of the product set for each of the product attributes (interest rate, product and provider 
ratings) following the same approach as with granularity. A higher positive number of skewness 
would suggest that the product set is more concentrated in the less attractive attribute values. 
Controlling for the skewness of the product attributes, we find that the main findings are robust. 
Further, higher positive skewness of product and provider ratings reduce consumer response. 
Next, we included the interaction terms between the skewness and granularity of each respective 
attribute. Conceptually, the effect of finer product set granularity would be weaker with high 
positive skewness since the more attractive product values would be more likely to stand out 
from the main body of the products. However, we rule this out, since we find that the effect of 
product granularity is robust and there is no moderating effect of attribute skewness. Next, we 
calculated the kurtosis of the product set attributes. A higher positive number of kurtosis in the 
product set would suggest a heavier tail, so conceptually more uniformly spread attributes. 
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Conceptually, in such product sets, the effect of granularity that case, the effect of granularity 
would be weaker. Controlling for the kurtosis of the product attributes, we find that the main 
findings are robust. Including the interaction with the granularity measures, we show that the 
effect of product granularity is robust and there is no moderating effect of attribute kurtosis. 
Third, we tested whether the effect of product set granularity on consumer response is 
moderated by the inter-attribute correlation among the alternatives in the recommended set and 
its quadratic. This analysis is motivated by the fact that when attribute values are more dispersed 
trade-offs among attributes might be amplified (Bettman et al. 1993). The main effects of 
granularity on consumer response remain robust and they are unaffected by the attribute 
correlation in the product set. Further, we include the interaction between the attribute 
attractiveness and the respective granularity measure, based on the rationale that the effect of 
finer compared to coarser granularity would be stronger in more attractive sets. We find that the 
main effects of granularity on consumer response remain robust and mainly unaffected by the 
attribute attractiveness. The only exception is a negative interaction effect of finer product rating 
granularity and product rating attractiveness. This result suggests that product rating granularity 
decreases consumer response when product ratings are high.  
 
[Insert Tables 3, 4 & 5 about here] 
 
Fourth, we investigated whether the main findings are driven by the existence (or absence 
of) the current bank provider of the consumer. The inclusion of the current bank in the set could 
make consumers spend more attention to this provider regardless of the actual product utility of 
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the options in the set.  However, we find that the results are robust and there is not interaction 
with the current bank in the set.   
Finally, we investigate the moderating effect of the consumer’s mortgage amount. When 
stakes are higher in a decision (higher mortgage amount) and personal income is lower, 
consumers are more likely to be more deliberative in their information processing since the 
consequence of a bad decision may more severe for them. We find no interaction effects of 
product set granularity with either the mortgage amount or the income of the consumers. As 
before, the main effects of product granularity also remain robust.   
Robustness Analyses 
In the interest of rigor, we also conducted a series of robustness tests to establish the 
validity of our results. These tests include different operationalizations of the granularity and the 
time ratio variables as well as alternative model specifications.  
Since the concept of product set granularity has no established standard for measurement, 
it is critical to test other measurements to rule out any concerns regarding the validity and 
sensitivity of such a measure (Table 6 & 7). First, we estimate the proposed models with 
product set granularity measures that are based on a smaller number of alternatives in the 
recommended set. More precisely, we calculate granularity based on the top-8 and down to the 
top-2 products in the product sets. Further, we operationalized product set granularity as (a) the 
average difference of all pairwise comparisons in the set, and (b) the standard deviation of the 
product attribute values. The results we find are qualitatively and directionally robust in terms 
of effects on consumer response and ratio of product time. Further, the mediation models remain 
robust. However, they become more distorted the more we restrict the range of products we 
measure granularity based on. 
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[Insert Tables 6 & 7 about here] 
 
Further, the results are robust when we include different operationalizations of the ratio of 
product time measure. More precisely, we used the ratio of product over set level time (Table 8 / 
Column 1). The results remain robust. Further, the effect of product set granularity on the ratio 
of product time is robust when we control for the decision to inspect any of the products (Table 
8 / Column 2), as well as when conducting the analysis in the subset of consumers who 
inspected a product (Table 8 / Column 3). Moreover, we applied a type-II Tobit model to 
control for a possible selectivity bias in page-view duration that arises from the fact that we 
observe time at the level of individual alternatives only when an alternative is inspected 
(Bucklin and Sismeiro 2003) (Table 8 / Columns 4-5).   
 
[Insert Tables 8 & 9 about here] 
 
Furthermore, given the set level of the analyses, we overlook the distribution of product 
level time across the products (e.g. a consumer who inspects two products for 8 and 2 minutes 
respectively, and one who inspects the same two products for 5 and 5 minutes are treated 
uniformly). For that reason, we calculated the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
concentration of time spent across the products. A higher value of HHI would suggest more 
concentration of the product time to fewer products. We first show that product set granularity 
has no effect on HHI (Table 9 / Column 1). Further, the results of ratio time and granularity are 
robust when controlling for the HHI of product time (Table 9 / Column 2). 
Next, we included the quadratic effects of granularity to allow for potential non-linearity 
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in the expected effects (Table 10 / Columns 1-2). Further, we replaced the most attractive value 
per attribute as a measure for the attractiveness of the alternatives in the recommended set by 
their mean attractiveness value over the top nine alternatives. This alternative measure captures 
the average attractiveness of the recommended set and controls for differences in the 
distribution of product values in the attribute space (Table 10 / Columns 3-4). The results 
remain robust in all models. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
Managerial Simulation Analysis 
To illustrate the managerial implications of our findings, we conduct simulation analyses 
that reveal how consumer response is affected by different levels of product set granularity 
compared to changes in the attractiveness of the top alternative in a recommendation list. Figure 
2 shows the effects of (1) finer product set granularity in a set and (2) the overall attractiveness 
of this set on consumer response. It is clear that product set granularity has an impact that is 
comparable in size to that of the attractiveness of the set, in terms of how it affects consumer 
response.  
To examine the magnitude and practical importance of finer product set granularity on 
consumer response, we calculate the probability of consumer response when product set 
granularity – controlling for the most attractive product in the list –increases in coarseness by 
0.01 percentage points. This increase in coarseness causes an average increase of 6.36 percent in 
the probability of consumer response over all visits. Perhaps the clearest illustration of the effect 
of finer product set granularity is the impact on consumer response when granularity is made 
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finer. We illustrate this impact by making the granularity 0.01 percentage points finer in the 
simulation. Note that, normatively, this change renders the recommendation list more attractive 
because it implies that the worst of the set of top alternatives becomes more attractive. However, 
we see that making the set of top alternatives objectively more attractive in this manner reduces 
the probability of consumer response by an average of 6.12 percent across all recommendation 
lists.  
To further illustrate the impact of product set granularity, an additional simulation analysis 
was run. This analysis reveals that one would have to raise the attractiveness of the best product 
in the recommended set by 2.82 percent to achieve the same boost in consumer response caused 
by increasing the coarseness in the level of granularity in product attractiveness by 0.01 
percentage points (see above). In monetary terms, this implies that a reduction in the mortgage 
interest rate of 0.125 percentage points would be needed to induce the same increase in consumer 
response as an increase in coarseness of 0.01 percentage points could achieve.  
Finally, we calculate how consumer response would be affected by the removal of any one of the 
intermediate alternatives in recommendation list (i.e., position 2 to 8). By doing so, the most 
attractive product remains available in the recommended set, but by excluding one other 
alternative in the set, we increase the coarseness of the granularity in the set. We find that on 
average by removing any one of these products, the probability of consumer response increases 
by 2.63 percent. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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Study 2: Experiment 
The analysis based on the field study and clickstream data provides us with evidence on the 
negative effect of finer product granularity on consumer response. To further provide evidence 
on the generalizability of these findings beyond the context of financial products, we conducted a 
scenario-based experiment. Our aim was to replicate the findings of our main study in a more 
controlled setting, and also in a different product context, consumer electronics. More precisely, 
we conducted a controlled experiment with digital cameras. The choice of this product category 
serves several purposes. First, digital cameras are products which do not have one single 
prevalent attribute as in the case of home mortgages (i.e., interest rate). Second, mortgage 
choices are a typical high engagement decision and the moderation analysis in the field study 
suggested that, the effect of finer granularity is present for consumers who are highly engaged 
with the decision process, but may not be present for less engaged consumers. Therefore, in this 
second study we also study the proposed conceptual process in a category and setting where 
consumers vary more in terms of engagement with the decision process.  
For this second study, we developed a web-based environment that simulated the structure 
of the website in the field study for a consumer digital camera purchase decision. We randomly 
assigned respondents to a fine vs coarse product recommendation set granularity condition. The 
fine granularity recommendation set was created using random attribute values based on pre-
specified means, standard deviations, and a fixed interattribute pairwise correlation structure. 
The attribute value specifications were based on market data of the 50 most popular digital 
cameras on Amazon.com at the time of the study. The interattribute pairwise correlation of all 
attributes was constant (-0.25), to reflect the average correlation in the field study. For the coarse 
granularity recommendation set, we kept the best value of each product attribute in the set 
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constant (compared to the fine granularity condition) and adjusted all the other attribute values 
by doubling the difference of each attribute value from the best value in the set. In that way, we 
were able to make the set granularity coarser without distorting the most attractive attribute value 
in the recommendation set or the set’s correlational structure.  
In the study, we first, we asked participants some general questions with respect to the 
product category. Then, we introduced them to the choice task. They were asked to imagine that 
they were interested in buying a digital camera and visited a trusted product comparison website 
for digital cameras. We introduced the relevant attributes for this shopping task (price, 
resolution, customer ratings, optical zoom, and camera weight). According to the task, 
respondents could make a digital camera purchase or decide not to buy any of the cameras in that 
website. Before the purchase task, we asked some questions to verify that respondents 
understood the scenario. Entering the task, respondents first were presented with a set level page 
that offered ten digital cameras described in terms of three product attributes (price, resolution 
and customer ratings). The cameras were sorted based on price. For each camera, respondents 
could choose to see more details (e.g. information on the optical zoom and the camera weight), 
or choose to purchase the camera. In order to imitate the website functionalities, when 
respondents clicked on one of these options, they were automatically taken to a corresponding 
page. Choosing to directly purchase a camera ended the task. When clicking on more details, 
respondents were directed to the respective detail page of the camera. After inspecting the 
additional information, they had the option to go back to the recommendation set and continue 
the task, or buy that camera. Respondents also had the option to postpone the purchase and not 
buy any of the cameras. To do so, they could select an option to defer their purchase, which also 
ended the task. An illustrative example of the experimental choice task design can be found in 
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Appendix D.  
In our analysis, we operationalize consumer response as a binary variable that captures 
whether a respondent decided to purchase any of the cameras (=1) or chose to defer the purchase 
(=0). A binary indicator variable based on the assigned condition of respondents was used to 
capture product set granularity (1 = fine granularity; 0 = coarse granularity). We measured the 
processing time at the set level and product level in every step of the choice task. In line with the 
field study, set level processing is measured as the total time spent on the page displaying the set 
of recommended cameras and product level processing is measured as the total time spent on 
pages with detailed information about each camera. We calculated the ratio of product time 
(Ratio Product Time) over the total time spent on these two types of pages. We further collected 
additional variables to measure consumers’ decision engagement. To do so, we asked 
participants about their familiarity, previous experience and knowledge with the product 
category (Galletta et al. 2006; Ho et al. 2010), as well as their general interest in the product 
category. Finally, we collected demographic information (age, gender, education, income). 
To confirm that the intended manipulation of the finer granularity of the product set 
accomplished its purpose, we conducted a manipulation check. We asked respondents the extent 
to which they agreed that the digital cameras strongly varied in each of the attributes. Perceived 
variety in the attribute values was significantly higher in the coarse granularity product set 
condition compared to the fine granularity product set condition (Mcoarse=5.60, Mfine=5.31, 
F=9.77, p=0.00).  
We recruited respondents via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). We excluded respondents 
who failed attention checks, spent an extremely large amount of time in the study (upper 5%), or 
with duplicate IP addresses. The final sample (N=399) consisted of 56.9% males, 71.4% 25-44 
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years old, and 77.4% with an undergraduate degree. The respondents in the two conditions were 
statistically indistinguishable in terms of decision engagement variables and demographic 
characteristics (Appendix E). 
Following the indicative field evidence suggesting a moderating role of consumer 
engagement with the decision process, we created a decision engagement dummy indicator 
variable. To do so we first conducted a median split to separate respondents in high and low 
decision engagement on each of their answers regarding their level of familiarity, previous 
knowledge, and interest in digital cameras (Mantel & Kardes 1999). The decision engagement 
indicator variable then took the value of 1 when respondents had previous experience with 
buying a digital camera, as well as belonged to the high engagement group for all the above 
variables; the indicator variable to a value of 0 otherwise. Following this approach, 57.6% of 
respondents were qualified as highly engaged in the decision process.  
We examined the effect of fine granularity on consumer response for the subset of highly 
engaged respondents and further investigated whether engagement with the decision process 
moderates the effect of granularity. For the highly engaged group of consumers, we confirm the 
field evidence regarding the effect of finer granularity (Table 11). Finer granularity decreases 
consumer response (β = -0.79, p < 0.05) and the ratio of product level information processing 
time (β = -0.05, p < 0.05). Further the ratio of product level information processing mediates the 
effect of product set granularity. A bootstrap analysis (Hayes 2012) showed a significant total 
indirect effect of finer interest rate granularity (effect = -0.24; se = 0.14; LB: -0.60; UB: -0.02). 
The results remain robust when we control for consumer demographics.  
Further, we examined whether engagement with the decision process moderates the effect 
of granularity (Table 12). In line with the field evidence, we find that the negative effect of fine 
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granularity is significant for consumers with high decision engagement (β= -1.54, p < 0.05), but 
not with low engagement. We also find that the effect of finer granularity for the highly engaged 
consumers on consumer response is mediated by the ratio of product information processing 
time, and in the expected direction. Finer product granularity reduced the ratio of product versus 
product plus set level time for highly engaged consumers. 
 
[Insert Tables 11 & 12 about here] 
 
In summary, the purpose of the experimental study was to provide further evidence on the 
generalizability of the effect of product set granularity in a more controlled setting and beyond 
the context of mortgage products. We also provided more clear evidence of the moderating effect 
of consumer decision engagement in a context which varied in terms of decision engagement. 
Thus, we demonstrate a negative effect of finer product set granularity on consumer response 
that is mediated by the ratio of product level processing time over the total of product and set 
level processing time. We also demonstrate that this process occurs for respondents who are 
highly engaged in the decision process, but not for those who are less engaged in the decision. 
 
General Discussion 
Product recommendations assist users in identifying better products in large assortments 
thus improving the accuracy of their decisions (Haubl and Trifts, 2000; Xiao and Benbasat 
2007). In this research, we studied field data from a prevalent type of recommendation system 
based on user-provided information over desired product specifications. These systems allow 
firms to present only the products that are relevant for a user and sort them according to a helpful 
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criterion (e.g., lowest price, or in our case, lowest interest rate). Common intuition, in line with 
normative models of consumer decision making, would suggest that to maximize consumer 
response to product recommendations firms should include the subset of most attractive 
alternatives at the top of the list of products they recommend. This approach is also evident in 
practice, where many recommendation systems present users with rather homogenous and 
similarly attractive options (Li and Karahanna 2015).  
The research presented here challenges this intuition by showing that consumer response to 
recommendations may benefit from presenting them with product assortments that are less, not 
more, fine-grained. In particular, we find that, when controlling for the most attractive 
recommended product, finer product granularity in the top recommended products (constituting a 
more attractive set of recommended alternatives) decreases the probability of consumer response.  
In doing so, we are also the first to provide actual field evidence of the impact of product 
closeness on consumer response (Dhar, 1996; Häubl & Trifts, 2000). To shed light on the 
behavioral mechanisms driving this effect, we decomposed the time consumers spent on the 
product recommendations into two components: set level and product level processing time. The 
results showed that the ratio of time spent processing information at the product level is 
decreased with finer product set granularity. This result suggests that, with finer product set 
granularity, consumers spend less time inspecting alternatives that they have identified as being 
attractive. This time-based effect fully mediated the impact of finer product set granularity on 
consumer response to product recommendations. To expand the generalizability of the findings, 
we conducted a controlled experiment in the context of consumer electronics. The controlled 
experimental setting allowed us to randomly assign respondents to different product sets (with 
fine or coarse product set granularity), irrespective of their own preferences. Replicating the field 
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evidence in such a controlled environment ensures that the effect of granularity is robust also in a 
context where individual choices are entirely independent to the generation of the choice sets that 
respondents face. We provided clear evidence of the negative effect of finer product set 
granularity on consumer response which is mediated by the ratio of product level processing 
time. 
We further provided evidence regarding the way the effects of finer product set granularity 
depends on how engaged customers are in the decision process. Consumers who are more 
engaged in a decision are likely to follow a more elaborate decision process, and hence the effect 
of finer product set granularity is prevalent in this group of customers. Our analyses of the field 
data of mortgage choices provided indicative results that product set granularity has a significant 
effect only for more engaged consumers. The fact that this effect is weak in this study is likely 
caused by the fact most consumers in the field data were highly engaged in the mortgage 
decision. This moderating effect was more strongly supported in the experimental evidence of 
the second study, were the context of consumer electronics allowed us to collect responses from 
consumers that vary in terms of decision engagement. 
 
Managerial Implications 
Our findings have clear managerial implications for how to compose the product 
granularity of recommendation sets to promote consumer response. In particular, when selecting 
products to be included in a recommendation list, there is a need to balance between (1) the 
attractiveness of the recommended products, and (2) the closeness in attractiveness between 
these products in the recommendation list (which generates decision difficulty). Product 
recommendation websites typically aim to present the best alternatives available. In doing so, 
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they offer consumers a truncated set of products that are inherently similar in terms of 
attractiveness. However, with finer product granularity, these recommended alternatives are 
closer in terms of attractiveness, which increases the choice difficulty that consumers experience. 
We find that this reduces the probability of consumer response. Indeed, our managerial 
simulation analysis shows that firms can increase consumer response by increasing the 
coarseness of the product set’s granularity while keeping the most attractive alternative in the set 
constant.  
Not including highly attractive alternatives in a recommendation list raises ethical issues 
and might damage a website’s reputation in the long term. Therefore, we advocate that the 
(predicted) most attractive product should always be presented to consumers. Keeping the best 
product constant, firms that increase the coarseness of the granularity of the total product set can 
effectively assist consumers in identifying that most attractive alternative among all alternatives 
included in the recommendation list. Then, given that our findings predict that consumers are 
more likely to choose the best product with a less fine-grained recommendation set, consumer 
welfare should improve (and the firm’s reputation should also be improved). This practice can be 
realized if a well-designed algorithm is available to generate product recommendations which 
also received accurate information about consumers’ preferences as input. Thus, this structure of 
the recommendation set represents a rather benevolent nudge to its users given that its impact is 
that consumers are more likely to choose the best alternative in the set.  
The results reported here are especially relevant for product recommendation websites 
because these often operate as intermediaries and do not have direct control over the design and 
attributes of the products that they can recommend (e.g., price, product features). An 
intermediary, however, can control which of the total set of available products to include in 
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constructing a recommended set. Thus, recommendation websites have greater control over the 
product granularity in the set of products presented in a recommendation than over the 
attractiveness level of the most attractive products in the market (which depends on what 
products are offered by manufacturers and service providers). 
Our research also shows that measures of online information processing time offer 
valuable insights to predict consumer response to recommendations. In particular, by 
distinguishing between the amount of time spent inspecting set level information versus product 
level information we could illuminate the decision process that governs consumer response to 
product recommendations. These time-based results also suggest that merely increasing the 
duration of a consumer’s visit to a recommendation website need not have a positive effect on 
consumer response. The impact strongly depends on how this time is allocated. Spending more 
time may, in fact, have a negative impact on consumer response when it involves extensive set 
level processing, reflecting the consumer’s challenge in identifying their preferred alternative. 
Limitations and Further Research 
We envision several promising avenues for future research. First, while the current analysis 
is based on field data, it is restricted to visits on the site that represented access to only a single 
recommended set. This was necessary for our analysis because when consumers face multiple 
recommendation lists, defining product set granularity becomes more intricate as it may vary 
between different sets that a consumer observes and there might be partial overlap between the 
sets of alternatives included in the different sets. Also, a consumer’s memory for product 
information from a previously observed set could play a more prominent role. Future research 
that examines consumer decision making in such multi-recommendation settings would be an 
important extension of this current study.  
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Our field evidence is based on a limited window of observation in terms of the size and 
nature of recommendation sets. Although we found a negative effect of finer product set 
granularity on consumer response, we also caution against fully dismissing the possibility that 
sets including very unattractive alternatives (i.e., much coarser product set granularity) can also, 
in some instances, have a negative effect on consumer response. In particular, one could imagine 
that if websites provided recommendation lists with substantially worse products, the very low 
attractiveness of these products might lead consumers to ignore them completely in their 
decision making. In such a case, increasing product set granularity coarseness might become 
ineffective because the very unattractive products would be eliminated from consideration and 
hence not affect consumer response. Further research could investigate such more extreme 
recommendation sets with highly unattractive products to determine empirical boundary 
conditions to our findings.  
The fact that coarser granularity may lead to the inclusion of worse alternatives, which may 
potentially lead to consumer concerns about the quality or unbiasedness of the recommendations. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the effects of (finer vs. coarser) product set 
granularity on consumer trust towards the website’s recommendations in follow-up research. 
Similarly, consumers who need to make a greater effort to choose in a fine-grained set, may feel 
dissatisfied with their product choice due to the increased cognitive resources they put (Klein and 
Yadav 1989), but they may also feel more satisfied due to their higher engagement in the task 
(Cardozo 1965; Norton et al. 2012). Future research could investigate if consumer trust in the 
website and the degree of product satisfaction are (subjective) mediators of effect of product 
granularity on consumer response.  
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The use of field data ensures a high level of external validity of the present findings 
compared to laboratory experiments or surveys, but it also imposes some inherent restrictions on 
our study. First, the latent purchase stage (e.g., browsing vs. buying) of the website visitors is not 
known to the researchers. The purchase stage of consumers can affect the likelihood that they 
have well-defined preferences and enter detailed product specifications. This may impact the 
composition of the product recommendation set that the consumer is offered by the website as 
well as the consumer’s propensity to complete a transaction at the end of the visit (Moe 2003). 
By using the endogenous demand specifications in our analysis and including the exogenous 
residuals of these models in our estimation we can control for this effect, but we cannot predict 
purchase effects based on both purchase stage and response to recommendations. Still the latter 
would also be valuable from a managerial perspective. In future research, a longer time window 
could be used to identify a consumer’s series of repeat visits. This approach might provide a 
more accurate indication of the latent purchase stage of individual consumers.  
Interestingly, with current advances in recommendation systems, many recommender 
systems attempt, using machine learning algorithms, to predict consumer behavior and 
recommend products to consumers based on other consumers’ choice behavior. However, in the 
context of this study, the website needs to know certain consumer specifications before making a 
tailored offer. It is an interesting question whether the use machine learning algorithms (instead 
of expert review scores) would change our findings. We expect that this may indeed be the case 
and that it may undesirable to use machine learning only in the type of recommendation 
environments that we study. The reason for incorporating experts’ advice is that consumer may 
be harmed if they are only following their own judgments (or are following machine learning 
algorithms that are only based on other consumers’ judgment). From a learning optimization 
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perspective, it also interesting that, once consumers they are provided with expert advice, 
consumer choices become co-determined by this advice, such that machine learning algorithms 
would learn about some (unknown) mix of consumer preference for product attributes and for 
following the expert advice. Firms then need to develop a strategy to disentangle these two 
decision components and a policy on how much they would wish to allow consumers to deviate 
from (objectively superior) expert advice. 
Information search patterns may differ based on the nature of the product searched 
(Chernev et al. 2015; Huang et al. 2009). In the empirical application, we studied a complex and 
utilitarian product. In this product category, price attributes (i.e., interest rates) were central in 
consumers’ decision making. We provide evidence on the generalizability of the findings by 
conducting a controlled experiment in the context of consumer electronics. The findings of both 
studies, and the overall conceptual model we propose, are likely to be generalizable to other 
product categories where consumers are relatively highly involved (but not to products that are 
bought impulsively or by habit). Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate how closely our 
findings generalize to product categories of a more hedonic nature, where alternatives vary more 
in terms of experiential aspects, quality-related attributes are more important, and product set 
granularity of recommended products may thus be less obvious.  
Further, a promising avenue for research would be to examine the effect of product set 
granularity in product sets with different levels and sources of complexity. For instance, previous 
research suggests that the nature of the attributes characterizing the products can affect consumer 
response in various directions (Chernev 2005; Gourville and Soman 2005). Thus, the combined 
effect of product granularity and other product characteristics would be worth investigating. 
Finally, while the effect of product set granularity on the decision of consumers to convert, i.e. to 
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make a purchase decision or not, is central to firms (Davis 2018) and previous research in 
decision making (Dhar 1997; Dhar and Nowlis 2004), it would be interesting to extend this study 
by combining it with insights from research that examines how choice set features influence 
which specific product consumers choose (Chernev 2005; Evangelidis & Levav 2013; Simonson 
& Tversky 1992).     
Conclusion 
We investigated the effect of product set granularity in recommendations on consumer 
response. While product recommendations help consumers identify more attractive products 
when assortments are fine-grained, they also amplify the challenge of selecting one’s preferred 
alternative due to the increased closeness in attractiveness of the recommended products which 
increases decision difficulty. We show in two studies, a field study and a controlled experiment, 
that finer product set granularity indeed decreases the probability of consumer response to 
product recommendations. This effect is mediated by the relative time consumers spend 
processing information at the level of individual alternatives in the recommendation list. These 
effects are less pronounced when consumer engagement in the decision process is relatively low. 
Our findings also have important managerial implications and show how recommendation 
websites can promote greater consumer response to recommendations when product sets are 
highly fine-grained.  
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Table 1: Main Results 
 1 2 3 4 
 
DV: 
Consumer 
Response 
 (Logit) 
DV: ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
DV: 
Consumer 
Response 
 (Logit) 
DV: 
Consumer 
Response 
 (Logit) 
Constant -0.76* 0.41** -1.88** -4.99** 
 (0.38) (0.06) (0.40) (0.46) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R)  0.58** 0.13** 0.34 0.30 
 (0.21) (0.03) (0.22) (0.22) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  -7.56** -1.21** -5.70 -5.34 
 (2.91) (0.44) (3.05) (3.09) 
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  0.17 0.02 0.13 0.05 
 (0.23) (0.03) (0.24) (0.24) 
Product Rating Set (finer) Granularity (R)  0.44 0.04 0.50 0.22 
 (1.32) (0.20) (1.37) (1.39) 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) -0.25 -0.12 0.00 -0.22 
 (0.69) (0.10) (0.73) (0.74) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  -2.50 -1.18 0.09 -1.63 
 (5.64) (0.85) (5.94) (5.99) 
Attribute Correlation (R) -0.14 0.02 -0.11 -0.10 
 (0.16) (0.01) (0.16) (0.17) 
Current Bank Provider (R) -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
Admin Fee (R) 0.99** -0.02 1.10** 1.09** 
 (0.30) (0.04) (0.32) (0.32) 
Ratio Product Time (L)    2.43** 2.32** 
   (0.10) (0.10) 
Total Time (L)     0.56** 
    (0.04) 
N 9330 9330 9330 9330 
R2 / Log-likelihood -5394.9 0.03 -4985.9 -4872.2 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 2: Moderation: Decision Engagement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 DV: Consumer Response (Logit) 
 
Engage
ment 
(low) 
Engage
ment 
(high) 
Amount 
Yes 
Amount 
No 
Income 
Yes# 
Fixed 
Period 
Yes 
Fixed 
Period 
No 
Constant -2.25
* 0.68 -0.29 -2.57 0.72 -0.52 1.11 
(0.95) (0.65) (0.67) (13.99) (0.54) (0.45) (75.80) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R)  0.26 0.67
** 0.67** 0.38 0.60** 0.59** 0.36 
(0.76) (0.22) (0.22) (0.79) (0.21) (0.23) (0.90) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  -7.53 -7.15* -7.69* -3.37 -6.79* -6.79* -13.13 
(8.34) (3.18) (3.17) (8.48) (2.93) (3.10) (11.28) 
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  -0.70 0.27 0.31 -0.90 0.13 0.13 1.33 
(0.60) (0.25) (0.25) (0.62) (0.23) (0.24) (1.27) 
Product Rating Set (finer) 
Granularity (R)  
-5.60 1.42 1.50 -5.93 0.31 0.29 14.67 
(3.80) (1.42) (1.42) (3.88) (1.32) (1.36) (10.05) 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) -1.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.76 -0.25 -0.48 7.31 
(1.88) (0.76) (0.76) (1.93) (0.69) (0.71) (5.57) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity 
(R)  
-9.93 -2.05 -2.07 -8.45 -2.58 -5.44 67.00 
(14.93) (6.26) (6.24) (15.40) (5.66) (5.79) (49.59) 
Attribute Correlation (R) 0.02 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 -0.17 -0.24 -0.00 
(0.46) (0.17) (0.17) (0.47) (0.16) (0.17) (0.49) 
Current Bank Provider (R) 0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.10 -0.03 -0.09 0.17 (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) 
Admin Fee (R) 3.37** 0.63 0.64 3.38** 0.98** 0.97** -0.13 
 (0.85) (0.33) (0.33) (0.87) (0.30) (0.34) (1.00) 
N 1726 7593 7625 1694 9282 7373 1955 
Log-likelihood -965.9 -4384.1 -4405.9 -943.3 -5364.2 120.4 -1062.4 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; # There were only 48 cases where no income was disclosed; For expositional clarity, 
control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 3: Moderator:  Skewness & Kurtosis of Product Set 
 1 2 3 4 
 DV: Consumer Response (Logit)  
Constant -0.78* -0.84* -0.76* -0.78* 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R) 0.57** 0.58** 0.61** 0.60** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  -7.97** -7.65* -7.51* -7.41* 
 (2.97) (3.04) (2.94) (2.96) 
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  0.66* 0.90** 0.20 0.15 
 (0.30) (0.34) (0.23) (0.24) 
Product Rating Set (finer) Granularity (R)  2.82 0.38 0.66 -0.73 
 (1.62) (2.15) (1.43) (2.33) 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) 1.60 1.56 -0.43 -0.59 
 (0.94) (0.94) (0.71) (0.73) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  5.50 5.47 -2.17 -3.02 
 (6.27) (6.31) (5.66) (5.80) 
Skewness Interest Rate (R) 0.05 0.03   
 (0.06) (0.06)   
Skewness Product Rating Attractiveness  (R) -0.12* -0.10*   
 (0.05) (0.05)   
Skewness Provider Rating Attractiveness  (R) -0.33** -0.27*   
 (0.12) (0.13)   
Skewness Interest Rate (R)* Interest Rate 
(finer) Granularity (R)  
 1.31   
 (4.90)   
Skewness Product Rating Attractiveness  (R)* 
Product Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  
 3.74   
 (2.18)   
Skewness Provider Rating Attractiveness  (R)* 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R) 
 -3.08   
 (4.20)   
Kurtosis Interest Rate (R)   -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Kurtosis Product Rating Attractiveness  (R)   -0.00 0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Kurtosis Provider Rating Attractiveness  (R)   0.04 0.04 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
Kurtosis Interest Rate (R)* Interest Rate (finer) 
Granularity (R)  
   -0.51 
   (1.58) 
Kurtosis Product Rating Attractiveness  (R)* 
Product Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  
   0.27 
   (0.37) 
Kurtosis Provider Rating Attractiveness (R)* 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R) 
   -1.07 
   (1.11) 
Attribute Correlation (R) -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Current Bank Provider (R) -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Admin Fee (R) 0.94** 0.96** 0.99** 1.01** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
N 9330 9330 9330 9330 
Log lik. -5387.39 -5385.47 -5393.83 -5393.09 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 4: Moderators: Product Set Features 
 1 2 3 
 
Interaction 
with Attribute 
Correlation 
Interaction with 
Attribute 
Attractiveness 
Interaction with 
Current bank 
 DV: Consumer Response (Logit) 
Constant -0.78* -0.85* -0.76* 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R) 0.60** 0.51* 0.59** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  -6.93* -7.92** -7.53** 
 (3.04) (3.00) (2.91) 
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  0.15 -0.17 0.16 
 (0.23) (0.29) (0.23) 
Product Rating Set (finer) Granularity (R)  0.46 -0.26 0.36 
 (1.34) (1.35) (1.32) 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) -0.31 -0.24 -0.25 
 (0.69) (0.80) (0.69) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  -3.42 -2.59 -2.57 
 (5.78) (5.68) (5.65) 
Attribute Correlation (R) * Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  9.00   
 (10.63)   
Attribute Correlation (R) * Product Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  -2.01   
(4.78)   
Attribute Correlation(R) * Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R) -3.26   
 (7.26)   
Interest Rate Attractiveness(R) * Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)   -23.47  
 (14.17)  
Product Rating Attractiveness (R) * Product Rating (finer) 
Granularity (R)  
 -12.00*  
 (6.12)  
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) * Provider Rating (finer) 
Granularity (R) 
 -1.12  
 (11.51)  
Attribute Correlation (R) -0.13 -0.12 -0.14 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Current Bank Provider (R) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Current Bank Provider (R) * Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)   4.74 
   (5.72) 
Current Bank Provider (R) * Product Rating (finer) Granularity (R)   -4.34 
   (2.96) 
Current Bank Provider (R) * Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)   -2.36 
   (3.27) 
Admin Fee (R) 0.97** 0.95** 0.99** 
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) 
N 9330 9330 9330 
Log lik. -5394.39 -5391.49 -5393.40 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 5: Moderators: Financial Characteristics 
 1 2 
 Moderation with  Mortgage Amount  
Moderation with  
Income 
 DV: Consumer Response (Logit) 
Constant -0.77* -0.77* 
 (0.38) (0.38) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R) 0.56** 0.58** 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  -10.90** -8.06* 
 (3.65) (3.66) 
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  0.16 0.16 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Product Rating Set (finer) Granularity (R)  -1.45 -0.83 
 (1.65) (1.65) 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) -0.35 -0.26 
 (0.69) (0.69) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  -4.86 -1.38 
 (5.83) (5.84) 
Amount_High (D)  -0.01  
 (0.07)  
Amount_High (D) * Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  6.70  
 (4.24)  
Amount_High (D) * Product Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  4.29  
 (2.25)  
Amount_High (D) * Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R) 2.78  
 (2.58)  
Income_High (D)   -0.04 
  (0.07) 
Income_High (D) * Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)   1.08 
  (4.28) 
Income_High (D) * Product Rating (finer) Granularity (R)   2.78 
  (2.21) 
Income_High (D) * Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  -2.85 
  (2.62) 
Attribute Correlation (R) -0.13 -0.03 
 (0.16) (0.06) 
Current Bank Provider (R) -0.03 -0.13 
 (0.06) (0.16) 
Admin Fee (R) 0.98** 0.99** 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
N 9330 9330 
Log lik. -5390.81 -5393.27 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 6: Alternative Measures of Granularity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 DV: Consumer Response (Logit) 
 
Top-9 Top-8 Top-7 Top-6 Top-5 Top-4 Top-3 Top-2 
Pair-
wise 
Diff St. Dev 
Constant -0.76* -0.77* -0.77* -0.75* -0.75* -0.75* -0.75* -0.76* -0.78* -0.76* 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Interest Rate 
Attractiveness (R) 
0.58** 0.58** 0.56** 0.53* 0.54** 0.54* 0.58** 0.49* 0.58** 0.57** 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Interest Rate (finer) 
Granularity(R)  
-7.56** -5.64* -5.07* -2.39 -3.12 -3.59 -1.16 -1.11 -60.51** -2.01* 
(2.91) (2.66) (2.33) (2.35) (1.62) (1.86) (1.13) (0.67) (23.29) (1.02) 
Product Rating 
Attractiveness (R)  
0.17 0.13 0.01 -0.37 -0.15 0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.17 0.16 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.24) (0.19) (0.13) (0.11) (0.23) (0.22) 
Product Rating Set 
(finer) Granularity (R)  
0.44 2.41* -0.02 -0.12 0.36 0.03 -0.14 -0.06 0.39 0.08 
(1.32) (1.18) (0.92) (0.75) (0.61) (0.48) (0.32) (0.10) (1.17) (0.29) 
Provider Rating 
Attractiveness (R) 
-0.25 -1.66** -0.33 0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 0.02 -0.25 0.17 
(0.69) (0.58) (0.36) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.18) (0.06) (0.69) (0.32) 
Provider Rating 
(finer) Granularity (R)  
-2.50 -13.84** -2.98 0.55 0.15 -0.34 0.52 0.03 -2.22 0.83 
(5.64) (4.25) (2.38) (1.36) (1.12) (0.89) (0.55) (0.02) (5.02) (0.96) 
N 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 
Log lik. -5394.9 -5389.7 -5395.1 -5395.7 -5396.2 -5396.1 -5395.7 -5394.1 -5394.9 -5395.9 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
 
Table 7: Alternative Measures of Granularity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 DV: Ratio Product Time (OLS) 
 
Top-9 Top-8 Top-7 Top-6 Top-5 Top-4 Top-3 Top-2 
Pair-
wise 
Diff St. Dev 
Constant 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.40** 0.41** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Interest Rate 
Attractiveness (R) 
0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.14** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Interest Rate (finer) 
Granularity (R)  
-1.21** -1.10** -0.99** -0.47 -0.52* -0.23 0.18 0.03 -9.71** -0.48** 
(0.44) (0.40) (0.35) (0.35) (0.24) (0.28) (0.17) (0.10) (3.49) (0.15) 
Product Rating 
Attractiveness (R)  
0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Product Rating Set 
(finer) Granularity (R)  
0.04 0.17 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 
(0.20) (0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.18) (0.04) 
Provider Rating 
Attractiveness (R) 
-0.12 -0.13 0.11* 0.07 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 0.01 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.05) 
Provider Rating 
(finer) Granularity (R)  
-1.18 -1.10 0.63 -0.23 -0.28 -0.18 0.18* -0.00 -1.05 0.03 
(0.85) (0.61) (0.36) (0.20) (0.17) (0.13) (0.08) (0.00) (0.75) (0.14) 
N 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 8: Robustness Models 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
DV: Ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
DV: Ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
DV: Ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
Heckman 
Stage 1: 
Product 
Inspection 
Heckman 
Stage 2: Ratio 
Product Time 
Constant 0.56
** -0.05* 0.65** 0.33 0.62** 
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.23) (0.03) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R)  0.17
** 0.04** 0.05** 0.38** 0.05* 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  -1.69** -0.36* -0.48* -4.20* -0.44* 
(0.65) (0.14) (0.19) (1.83) (0.19) 
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.02 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) 
Product Rating Set (finer) 
Granularity (R)  
0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.03 
(0.30) (0.07) (0.09) (0.84) (0.08) 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) -0.18 -0.06 -0.09 -0.2 -0.06 
(0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) 
Provider Rating (finer) 
Granularity (R)  
-1.76 -0.60* -0.86* -1.81 -0.67 
(1.26) (0.28) (0.38) (3.5) (0.36) 
Attribute Correlation (R) -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.12 0.00 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.1) (0.01) 
Current Bank Provider (R) 0.03* 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Admin Fee (R) -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) 
Product Inspection (D)  0.72**    
  (0.00)    
N 9330 9330 6934 9330 2396 
R2/ Log-Likelihood 0.03 0.89 0.03              -249.99 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 9: Robustness Models – HH Index 
 1 2 
 DV: HHI (OLS) 
DV: Consumer 
Response 
(Logit) 
Constant 0.36
** -1.05* 
(0.08) (0.38) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R)  0.02 0.59
* 
(0.04) (0.21) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  0.13 -7.90* 
(0.57) (2.95) 
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  -0.03 0.19 
(0.05) (0.23) 
Product Rating Set (finer) Granularity (R)  -0.16 0.58 
(0.26) (1.33) 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) 0.01 -0.29 
(0.06) (0.31) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  -0.37 -2.43 
(1.11) (5.71) 
Attribute Correlation (R) -0.03 -0.12 (0.03) (0.16) 
Current Bank Provider (R) 0.00 -0.03 
(0.01) (0.06) 
Admin Fee (R) 0.10 0.93** 
 (0.06) (0.31) 
HH Index  0.76** 
  (0.05) 
N 9330 6934 
R2/ Log-Likelihood 0.01 -5293.06 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table. 
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Table 10: Robustness Checks 
 1 2   
 
DV: 
Consumer 
Response 
 (Logit) 
DV: ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
DV: 
Consumer 
Response 
 (Logit) 
DV: ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
Constant -0.90* 0.40** -0.76 0.41** 
 (0.39) (0.06) (0.38) (0.06) 
Interest Rate Attractiveness (R)  0.60* 0.13** 0.59* 0.14** 
 (0.21) (0.03) (0.21) (0.03) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity (R)  -6.79* -1.16* -10.31** -1.85** 
 (3.46) (0.51) (3.09) (0.46) 
Interest Rate (finer) Granularity2 (R)  47.01 3.86   
 (116.37) (17.95)   
Product Rating Attractiveness (R)  0.05 0.02 0.17 0.02 
 (0.24) (0.04) (0.23) (0.03) 
Product Rating Set (finer) Granularity (R)  -2.85 -0.08 0.41 0.03 
 (93.22) (0.31) (1.32) (0.2) 
Product Rating Set (finer) Granularity2 (R)  54.44* 1.83   
 (25.96) (4.06)   
Provider Rating Attractiveness (R) -2.27 -0.12 -0.27 -0.13 
 (6.68) (0.11) (0.3) (0.04) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity (R)  -0.21 -1.16 -2.76 -1.25 
 (0.7) (1) (5.66) (0.85) 
Provider Rating (finer) Granularity2 (R)  0.14 -0.12   
 (93.22) (0.1)   
Attribute Correlation (R) -0.03 0.02 -0.14 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.16) (0.02) 
Current Bank Provider (R) -0.15 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) 
Admin Fee (R) 0.94** -0.02 0.99** -0.02 
 (0.3) (0.04) (0.30) (0.04) 
N 9330 9330 9330 9330 
R2 / Log-likelihood 133.10 0.03 -5395.01 0.03 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable, (R) Residuals; For expositional clarity, control variables are not included in the table.  
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Table 11: Study 2 Results - High Decision Engagement Respondents 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DV: Consumer Response (Logit) 
DV: Ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
DV: Consumer 
Response (Logit) 
Constant 2.27** 0.58** -0.79 
 (0.32) (0.02) (1.02) 
 (finer) Granularity  -0.79* -0.05* -0.64 
 (0.40) (0.02) (0.43) 
Ratio(TimeProduct(L)/(Time(Set + Product)(L) )   4.43** 
   (1.00) 
TimeTotal (L)   0.20 
   (0.23) 
N 230 230 230 
Log likelihood / R2 -90.73 0.02 -79.78 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable  
 
 
Table 12: Study 2 Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DV: Consumer Response (Logit) 
DV: Ratio 
Product Time 
(OLS) 
DV: Consumer 
Response (Logit) 
Constant 1.67** 0.49** -0.69 
 (0.28) (0.02) (0.85) 
 (finer) Granularity  0.75 0.07* 0.32 
 (0.51) (0.03) (0.55) 
Decision Engagement  0.59 0.10** 0.05 
 (0.42) (0.03) (0.48) 
Decision Engagement *  (finer) Granularity -1.54* -0.12** -0.92 
 (0.65) (0.04) (0.71) 
Ratio(TimeProduct(L)/(Time(Set + Product)(L) )   5.17** 
   (0.80) 
TimeTotal (L)   0.06 
   (0.19) 
N 399 399 399 
Log likelihood / R2 -152.99 0.04 -128.20 
Coefficients are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (L) Natural Logarithm form of 
the variable  
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Impact of (Finer) Interest Rate Granularity on Consumer Response 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics and control variables 
Variable Mean Median Min Max. 
User and Demand Specifications 
Interest Rate attractiveness (lowest) 4.31 4.40 2.70 5.65 
Interest Rate Granularity -0.03 -0.03 -0.14 -0.01 
Product Rating Attractiveness (highest) 3.02 3.00 3.00 4.00 
Product Rating Granularity -0.11 1.00 -0.22 0.00 
Provider Rating Attractiveness (highest) 7.11 7.20 6.39 7.22 
Provider Rating Granularity -0.13 1.20 -0.15 -0.00 
Attribute correlation -0.06 -0.09 -0.84 0.73 
Admin Fee 1.36 2.00 0.00 2.00 
User Time (in seconds) 
TimeSet 133.7 69 10 2,924 
TimeProduct* 119.1 78 1 4,286 
Ratio Product Time 0.54 0.69 0 0.99 
Control Variables 
Fixed Period Disclosed 0.79 1.00 0 1 
Fixed Period  8.60 10.00 0 30 
Income Disclosed  0.99 1.00 0 1 
Income (L) 10.68 10.67 0 18.37 
Amount Disclosed   0.82 1.00 0 1 
Amount (L)  9.98 12.12 0 16.98 
Mortgage Type 1.51 2.00 0 2 
Weekend 0.83 2.00 0 1 
Hour 15.28 2.00 0 24 
Brand included in the set^ 0.15 – 0.81 0 1 
Current Bank in the set 0.19 0 0 1 
* Time given inspection; (D) Dummy variables, (L) Natural Logarithm form of the variable; ^ 26 brand 
dummy variables included 
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Appendix B – Models for variation in the alternatives to obtain residual measures 
 
(1) 
Attractiveness 
(Best Interest 
Rate)(M) 
(2) Best 
Product 
Rating 
(3) Best 
Provider 
Rating 
(4) 
Granularity 
(5) Range 
Product 
Rating  
Constant 4.41** (0.03) 3.19** (0.02) 7.11** (0.02) -0.03** (0.00) 0.82** (0.03) 
Period Dummy(D) -1.53** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00** (0.00) -0.01 (0.01) 
Fixed Period Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Income Dummy(D) -0.69** (0.05) 0.03 (0.03) -0.19** (0.04) 0.03** (0.00) 0.06 (0.05) 
Income (L)  0.06** (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.02** (0.00) -0.00** (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 
Amount Dummy(D)  -1.07** (0.04) 0.00 (0.02) -0.12** (0.03) 0.02** (0.00) -0.11** (0.04) 
Amount (L)  0.09** (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) -0.00** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 
Mortgage Type Fixed 
Effects 
Included Included Included Included Included 
N 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 
R2 0.89 0.18 0.10 0.60 0.13 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (D) Dummy variables, (L) Natural Logarithm form of the variable, (M) multiplied by minus 1. 
 
 
(6)  
Range 
Provider 
Rating 
(7)  
Nr Providers 
(8) 
Interattribute 
Correlation 
(9)  
Current 
(10)  
Admin Fee 
Constant 1.06** (0.03) 7.65** (0.10) -0.14** (0.03) -0.83* (0.35) 1.27** (0.03) 
Period Dummy(D) -0.03** (0.01) -0.86** (0.03) 0.14** (0.01) -2.59** (0.30) 0.24** (0.01) 
Fixed Period Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included 
Income Dummy(D) -0.04 (0.04) -0.28 (0.17) -0.32** (0.06) -2.76** (0.62) -0.06 (0.05) 
Income (L)  0.00 (0.00) 0.03* (0.01) 0.03** (0.00) 0.21** (0.05) 0.01** (0.00) 
Amount Dummy(D)  0.05 (0.03) -0.18 (0.13) -0.17** (0.04) -1.15* (0.54) -0.26** (0.04) 
Amount (L)  -0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02** (0.00) 0.08 (0.04) 0.02** (0.00) 
Mortgage Type Fixed 
Effects 
Included Included Included Included Included 
N 9330 9330 9330 9330 9330 
R2 0.09 0.56 0.23 0.03 0.44 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01; (D) Dummy variables, (L) Natural Logarithm form of the variable, (M) multiplied by minus 1. 
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Appendix C: Overview of the recommendation sets (Experiment) 
Fine Product Set Granularity  
# Camera 
Price 
Resolution  
(in Megapixels) 
Customer  
Rating 
Optical  
Zoom 
Camera 
Weight 
1 190 14.8 3.9 10.7 474 
2 200 18.8 4.0 10.1 542 
3 229 19.6 4.5 6.8 474 
4 234 17.5 4.2 9.8 495 
5 237 16.3 4.8 10.8 556 
6 261 16.8 4.9 8.8 482 
7 269 21.8 3.7 10.2 503 
8 272 19.7 4.5 11.0 560 
9 288 17.1 4.0 11.0 440 
10 320 17.7 4.6 10.8 475 
 
 
Coarse Product Set Granularity  
# Camera 
Price 
Resolution (in 
Megapixels) 
Customer  
Rating 
Optical  
Zoom 
Camera 
Weight 
1 190 7.9 2.9 10.4 508 
2 210 15.8 3.2 9.2 645 
3 267 17.3 4.1 2.5 507 
4 278 13.2 3.6 8.7 550 
5 283 10.8 4.8 10.7 672 
6 333 11.8 4.9 6.5 525 
7 348 21.8 2.6 9.3 565 
8 353 17.6 4.1 11.0 679 
9 387 12.3 3.1 11.0 440 
10 451 13.5 4.3 10.6 510 
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Appendix D: Experimental Choice Task Design 
Set level Page Product Level Page (Details) 
                                               
 
Product Level Page (Directly Buy) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Appendix E: Randomization Check (Experiment) 
# Condition N Familiarity Interest Previous Knowledge Gender Age Education Income 
1 Fine 
Granularity 
212 5.40 4.86 4.71 0.45 2.83 0.94 5.40 
2 Coarse 
Granularity 
187 5.48 4.81 4.66 0.41 2.70 0.96 5.39 
p-value 0.45 0.74 0.67 0.47 0.24 0.76 0.97 
 
 
